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Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance

Cynthia A. Williams
Osler Chair in Business Law
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada

Chapter for OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
(Jeff Gordon & Georg Ringe, eds., forthcoming)

Abstract
Corporate social responsibility has become a subject of growing importance in business and law.
Today, no analysis of corporate governance systems would be complete without considering the
pressures on companies to be seen as responsible corporate citizens. This chapter first provides a
descriptive overview of developments in the field, including increasing voluntary and required
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure; and proliferating voluntary and
multilateral standards for responsible corporate behavior. This chapter then reviews some of the
more significant empirical evidence on the financial results of companies’ implementation of
corporate responsibility initiatives, including the effects of such initiatives on innovation, trust,
and social welfare. It concludes with an analysis relating these developments to arguments over
the objectives of the corporation and the shareholder/stakeholder debate.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Corporate social responsibility is a topic that has been given increased attention in the last
two decades in practice and in theory, both in management and law. Defined in an influential
1970’s article as “the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the . . . economic,
technical, and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social benefits along with the

1

traditional economic gains which the firm seeks,” 1 the European Commission more simply
defined it in 2011 as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.” 2

As the

Commission stated in adopting that definition, “[e]nterprises should have in place a process to
integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their business
operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders.” 3 Thus, the emphasis
has shifted from philanthropy and attention to corporate action “beyond law,” to an inquiry into
how a company conducts its business. Indicative of this shift, many academics and practitioners
in management now refer to the topic as corporate responsibility, not corporate social
responsibility, as will this author. 4
What is some evidence of a developing norm of corporate responsibility? Few global
companies today fail to highlight their social initiatives and performance on their websites, while
over 90% of the Global 250 companies voluntarily disclose more environmental, social and
governance (ESG) information than required by law. 5 Voluntary, transnational standards of best
social and environmental practices are proliferating in virtually every industry, many with
associated certification schemes and requirements for third-party attestation or auditing. 6 These
voluntary initiatives are increasingly being supplemented by domestic and multilateral
government actions to encourage, or in some cases require, companies to pay closer attention to
1

Keith Davis, The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities, 16 AM. MNGMT. J. 312,
312 (1973).
2
European Commission, A Renewed European Union Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM
(2011) 681, ¶ 3.1.
3
See id.
4
See Céline Gainet, Exploring the Impact of legal Systems and Financial Structures on CR, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 195,
197 (2010)(discussing shift in nomenclature from “corporate social responsibility” to “corporate responsibility,” for,
among other reasons, encompassing the concept of both social and environmental responsibilities in a single term).
5
See KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, available at
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporateresponsibility/Documents/corporate-responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf .
6
See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008).
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the social and environmental consequences of their actions and to disclose more information
about those consequences. 7
Investors as well have become more attentive in recent years to environmental and social
risks in portfolio companies, and therefore more concerned with corporate responsibility. Global
assets under management with sustainability screens have risen 61% since 2012, to US$ 21.4
trillion at the start of 2014. 8 Institutions managing US$ 45 trillion of invested capital have
committed to the U.N. Environment Program’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI),
which require investors to incorporate ESG issues into investment practices across their asset
classes. 9 And, as of 2015, over US$ 92 trillion of the world’s invested capital backs the Carbon
Disclosure Project (CDP) ’s work with 2,000 companies around the world to gather data on those
companies’ greenhouse gas emissions. 10 These data are then provided to Bloomberg for
incorporation with other ESG data that Bloomberg now sells, since 2009, to investors around the
world. 11 Indeed, corporate responsibility itself has become an industry, one a critical NGO
noted has London “awash with PR consultants, social auditors, firms providing verification or
‘assurance’ for companies’ social and environmental reports, and bespoke investment analysts all
vying for business.” 12
While these trends indicate that corporate responsibility has achieved some place within
mainstream corporate and investor activities, that place is deeply contested, in both theory and
7

See Parts II, B, 2 and III , infra.
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review 2014, available at
www.sustainabilityHQ.com.
9
United Nations Environment Program Principles for Responsible Investment, available at
http://www.unpri.org/about-pri.
10
Carbon Disclosure Project, Catalyzing Business and Government Action, available at http://www.cdp.net/enUS/Pages/About-Us.aspx.
11
See Table 3, infra, for a summary of the environmental and social data that Bloomberg now sells to its broker and
dealer clients.
12
Christian Aid, Behind the Mask: The Real Face of Corporate Social Responsibility 8 (2004).
8
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practice. Everything from the history of corporate responsibility, its importance, its effects, and
its legitimacy is subject to challenge, depending on the underlying corporate governance system
of a country in question, how countries arrange their social welfare provision, the relationship of
the state to the market, and even the theory of the nature of the corporation one holds. In
important respects corporate responsibility is both too strong and too weak: too strong an
assertion of a social role for the corporation and its directors to coexist comfortably with the
view of the purely economic role of the corporation within shareholder-focused corporate
governance systems, and yet too weak for academics taking a stakeholder view of the
corporation who are concerned with global problems they view companies as having helped to
create, including climate change, environmental degradation, exploitative labor conditions and
worsening economic inequality.
This chapter will proceed as follows. Part 2 will describe voluntary corporate responsibility
initiatives, followed in Part 3 by some of the more significant legal developments on the topic.
Part 4 will discuss empirical evidence about the financial and social effects of corporate
responsibility, including interactions with corporate governance structures. Part 5 will evaluate
these corporate responsibility trends, and Part 6 will conclude.
II. VOLUNTARY CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES
A. Corporate Responsibility Reporting
The clearest demonstration of the evolution of corporate responsibility from academic theory
to mainstream business practice is in the trends with respect to corporate reporting of

4

environmental, social and governance (ESG) information. 13 While some jurisdictions are starting
to require ESG reporting (as described below), much of this reporting is still voluntary. It can
thus be interpreted as an indication of companies’ perceptions of the social expectations of
business, even as companies seek to manage those expectations through their corporate
responsibility reporting. 14
The most comprehensive source of data on ESG reporting is that done by KPMG in the
Netherlands. KPMG published its first ESG report in 1993, and its most recent in 2013. In
1993, 12% of the top 100 companies in the OECD countries (ex. Japan) published an
environmental or social report. 15 By 2013, 76% of the top 100 companies in the Americas
publish a separate corporate responsibility report, as do 73% of top 100 companies in Europe and
71% in Asia. 16 Of the largest 250 companies globally, reporting rates are 93%. 17 The Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework for ESG reporting has
emerged as the clear global benchmark: 78% of reporting companies worldwide and 82% of the
Global 250 use GRI as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting. 18 Of particular note,

13

For an excellent overview of the evolution of corporate responsibility as an academic theory in the management
literature, see Archie V. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUS. &
SOC’TY 268 (1999).
14
See Sara B. Feldner & Kati T. Berg, How Corporations Manage Industry and consumer Expectations via the CR
Report, 8(3) PUBLIC RELATIONS J. (2014), available at www.prsa.org/prjournal; Ronen Shamir, The DeRadicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 669, 675 (2004).
15
See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENVIRONMENT &
SUSTAINABLE DEVEL. 51, 52 Figure 1 (2004). KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original 1993
report on corporate responsibility reporting, so direct comparisons are not possible between the Global 250 in 1993
and the Global 250 in 2013.
16
KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, at 10, available at
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporateresponsibility/Documents/corporate-responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf (last visited March 5,
2015).
17
See id.
18
See id.at 11. The Global Reporting Initiative is now in its fourth iteration. It has been developed by, and is used
by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the economic,
environmental, social and governance effects of entities’ actions. See Global Reporting Initiative, available at
http://www.globalreporting.org.
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slightly over half (59%) of the Global 250 now have their reports “assured,” most often (twothirds of the time) by the specialist bureaus of the major accountancy firms. 19
In addition to the quantity of corporate responsibility reporting, KPMG also evaluates the
quality of reporting. Here, European companies generally do substantially better than those in
Asia or the Americas (average quality scores of 71 out of 100 in Europe versus 54 for companies
in the Americas and 50 in Asia Pacific). 20 Within the Global 250, companies are starting to see
more opportunities than risks from social and environmental factors, such as for the development
of new products and services. Eighty-seven percent of the Global 250 identify climate change,
material resource scarcity and trends in energy and fuel as “megatrends” that will affect their
business. 21 Ultimately KPMG concludes that “[m]any companies no longer see corporate
responsibility as a moral issue, but as core business risks and opportunities.” 22 This conclusion
is consistent with the views of prominent management academics Michael Porter and Mark
Kramer, 23 and Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel, 24 each of whom (among others) has
argued for companies to use corporate responsibility initiatives as part of their business strategies
to promote competitive advantage.
B. Substantive Corporate Responsibility Initiatives
1. Private Initiatives

19

See KPMG 2013 Report, supra note 16, at 11.
See id. at 14.
21
See id. at 14-15.
22
See id. at 15.
23
See Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and
Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. 78 ( DEC. 2006).
24
See Abagail McWilliams & Donald S. Siegel, Creating and Capturing Value: Strategic Corporate Social
Responsibility, Resource-Based Theory, and Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 37 J. OF MANGMT. 1480 (2011).
20
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The focus on expanded ESG disclosure has occurred concomitantly with the proliferation of
transnational, voluntary standards for what constitutes responsible corporate action. Thus, over
the past two decades such standards have been developed by states; public/private partnerships;
multi-stakeholder negotiation processes; industries and companies; institutional investors;
functional groups such as accountancy firms and social assurance consulting groups (many of
which did not exist more than ten years ago); NGOs; and non-financial ratings agencies. 25
Standards have been developed in just about every industry, from apparel 26 to chemicals, 27
extractives such as oil, gas and minerals 28 to conflict-free diamonds; 29 sustainable fisheries 30 and
forestry; 31 project finance 32 and fair-trade goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa and cotton, 33 to name
just a few examples. Thousands of individual companies have adopted voluntary codes of
conduct establishing standards for responsible behavior, and some companies then engage third-

25

See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). The implications of these standards for theories of corporate governance, regulation,
and economic development are profound, some of which the author has explored in prior work. See Cynthia A.
Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value
Construct, 38 CORN. INT’L. J. J. 493(2005).
26
See, e.g., The Fair Labor Associations, http://www.FLA.org, or the Workers’ Rights Consortium,
http://www.workersrights.org. For a discussion of these and other standards for the global supply chain in the
apparel industry, see Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems of Labor
Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1 (2003).
27
See Responsible Care, http://www.canadianchemistry.ca/responsible_care/index.php/en/responsible-care-history;
Jean M. Belanger, Responsible Care in Canada: The Evolution of an Ethic and a Commitment, 27 CHEM. INT’L 2
(March-April) 2005. The standards developed for responsible industrial chemicals production are in place in over
60 countries, as of 2015, and now include greenhouse gas reporting and assurance.
28
See The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, available at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org.
29
See The Kimberly Process, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com.
30
See, e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council certification process, http://www.msc.org.
31
See Forest Stewardship Council: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, available at http://www.fsc.org.
Competition between the forest standards promulgated by business versus those promulgated by NGOs has been
extensively studied by leading students of regulation and political theory. See BENJAMIN CASHORE, GRAEME AULD
& DEANNA NEWSOM, GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NONSTATE AUTHORITY (Yale Univ. Press 2004); Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public
Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L LAW 47, 51 (2006).
32
See The Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com. See also John M. Conley & Cynthia A.
Williams, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators: The Equator Principles, 33:4 J. L. & POLICY REV. 542
(2011).
33
See http://www.fairtrade.net/certification_mark.html for an overview of the fair trade requirements.
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party certifiers to ensure that their suppliers and subsidiaries are meeting those standards. 34
Multi-sector codes have also been developed with standards that are designed to apply across
industries. Of particular note here is Social Accountability 8000, which is based on the
International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 35 but adds
a commitment to a living wage, and a commitment to compliance with U.N. international human
rights protections. 36 SA 8000 also includes a requirement for independent monitoring of code
compliance prior to certification that specific productive facilities meet the SA8000 standards.
Another multi-sector example is the Ethical Trading Institute, which is a London-based tri-partite
labor, industry and NGO organization working to incorporate ILO protections into supply chains
for products bound for the Western markets. 37 ETI works in a deliberative fashion, using
monitoring, evaluation and on-going learning to both improve standards for the 9.8 million
people incorporated into the 70 companies’ supply chains (as of 2015), but also to teach workers
their rights and how to advocate for them independently. 38
2. Multilateral Initiatives
A number of significant multilateral instruments have also been developed or recently
strengthened by organizations comprised of government representatives. While these
instruments do not establish binding treaty obligations, they do articulate governments’
34

See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008). The University of Minnesota Law School, under the leadership of
international human rights scholar Prof. David Weissbrodt, has an extensive collection of human rights materials online, including copies of hundreds of firms’ codes of conduct. See
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/codes.html.
35
The International Labour Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
focusses on four core rights: freedom of association and rights to collective bargaining, freedom from forced labor
or prison labor, freedom from child labor exploitation and non-discrimination. See International Labour
Organization, available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm.
36
See Social Accountability 8000, available at http://www.sa-intl.org.
37
See Ethical Trading Initiative, available at http://www.ethicaltrade.org.
38
See Ethical Trading Initiative, available at http://www.ethicaltrade.org/news-and-events/press-resources/eti-keyachievements.
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expectations of responsible corporate action. Four are of particular note: the OECD’s
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the ISO 26,000 Corporate Responsibility standards; the
U.N.’s Global Compact; and the U.N.’s more recent “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework
articulating states’ and companies’ human rights responsibilities.
The OECD’s Guidelines, initially promulgated in 1976 and most recently amended in 2011,
encourage companies to promote sustainable development, and include standards based on ILO
and U.N. treaty obligations, including standards of transparency, labor protection, international
human rights protection, responsible supply chain management, environmental protection, antibribery standards and fair tax contributions (added in 2011 and unique among international
corporate responsibility standards). 39 A number of aspects of the OECD approach are of
particular importance. First, the standards are developed through tri-partite participation of
governments (through the OECD itself), business (the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee to the OECD) and labor (the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD). This
approach is typical of the “social partners” view of economic life in Europe. Second, the OECD
is starting to develop sector-specific guidance for responsible business conduct in a number of
areas: agricultural supply chains, financial sector due diligence, textile and garment supply
chains, extractive sector stakeholder engagement and mineral supply chains. Third, the OECD
countries, which include most of the developed economies (excepting Brazil, Russia, India and
China), all commit to establish National Contact Points (NCPs) to whom challenges may be
brought where individuals feel their OECD rights have been violated. Labor, in particular, has

39

See Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate.mne.
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been proactive in using these NCPs to address violations, and by so doing a record of global
labor rights and responsibilities is slowly being developed. 40
The International Standards Organization (ISO), which has developed thousands of technical
standards since its establishment after World War II, developed the ISO 26,000 standard for
corporate responsibility in 2010, after five years of consultation among standards bodies. 41
Unlike most of its standards, against which certification can occur, ISO 26,000 is not a standard
to provide guidance for certification. It does, however, provide a useful definition of corporate
responsibility:
CSR is the responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on
society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behavior that contributes to
sustainable development, including health and the welfare of society, takes into account the
expectations of stakeholders, is in compliance with applicable laws and with international
norms of behavior, and is integrated throughout the organization and practiced in its
relationships. 42
ISO 26,000 is important as evidence of the developing global norm of corporate responsibility:
developed with representation from 90 countries and 40 international or regional organizations, it
was drafted with input from consumers, governments, industry, labor, NGOs and “service,
support, research, academics and others,” 43 and so can credibly claim to represent a global
consensus about companies’ social responsibilities. To read the specific standards one must buy
them (somewhat ironic where one responsibility principle is transparency, but an apparently
successful business model), but an outline of the topics is available. ISO 26,0000 defines general
principles of accountability, transparency, ethical behavior, respect for stakeholder interests, for

40

See John Evans, Organizing workers globally: the need for public policy to regulate investment, in THE
EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM (Cynthia A. Williams and Peer
Zumbansen, eds.)(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011), at 343-353.
41
See ISO 26,000-Social Responsibility, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm.
42
See id.
43
See id.

10

rule of law, for international norms and human rights as the field of corporate responsibility; and
core subjects include governance, human rights, labor practices, the environment, fair operating
practices, consumer issues, and community involvement. 44
The United Nations began its work on corporate responsibility in 2000 under Secretary
General Kofi Annan with the Global Compact, a policy initiative in which businesses commit to
respect ten principles that cover four areas of concern (international human rights, labor
protection, environmental protection, and anti-corruption). 45 By 2015, 12,000 businesses,
academic institutions, and NGOs in 140 countries had signed onto the Global Compact.
Governance efforts are underway to make corporate commitments to the Global Compact
framework meaningful, including requirements for participants to communicate annually on their
progress regarding the four areas of concern. Still, by 2008 close to 15% of companies had been
de-listed from the Global Compact for failing to report on their progress, and the Global
Compact continues to be criticized for its lack of specificity. 46
Among multilateral frameworks, the U.N.’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011, seems to have the greatest potential
to develop into a baseline global legal framework for companies’ social responsibilities. (The
OECD Principles only apply to companies in or from adhering countries.) The U.N. Guiding
Principles set out the core spheres of obligation for states and companies with respect to human
rights: states have the duty to protect their citizens from violations by third parties, including
companies, by promulgating laws and regulations; companies have the responsibility to act with
44

See Guidance on ISO 26,0000, available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en:sec:A.
See U.N. Global Compact Annual Review 2010, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/UNGC_Annual_Review_2010.pdf.
46
See Jette Steen Knudsen, Which Companies Benefit Most from U.N. Global Compact Membership?, available at
http://www.EuropeanBusinessReview.com/?p=3167 (citing statistics, and asserting that the Global Compact is
primarily useful for large companies to fill a governance void as they operate in less developed countries).
45
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due diligence to respect citizens’ human rights; and both have the duty to provide access to
remedies for victims. Developed after the failure in 2004 of the U.N. Human Right’s
Commission’s Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, which “business vehemently opposed,” 47 the
Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework was developed in a six-year process led by Prof. John
Ruggie of Harvard University. The international human rights obligations applicable to
companies through the Guiding Principles include those in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the Core Conventions of the ILO. 48

The state duty to protect human rights

is now being incorporated into many European and other countries by the establishment of
National Action Plans to disseminate and implement the Guiding Principles. 49 At the same time,
an NGO called the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, supported by the UK and
German governments, has launched a ranking of companies’ human rights records in response to
the Guiding Principles. 50 The combination of global standards supported by and being
implemented by a broad array of governments, a standards-development process that was
inclusive, transparent and well-balanced between companies, labor and NGOs, and a dedicated
NGO collecting data and publicizing it, gives the U.N. Guiding Principles the potential to
become the de facto global corporate responsibility standard.
III.

SIGNIFICANT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

47

See U.N. Guiding Principles, available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-andmaterials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf.
48
See id.
49
See Guidelines for the U.N. Guiding Principles, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx.
50
See Phil Bloomer, Human Rights and Big Business: new ranking aims to drive race to the top, The Guardian (14
Jan. 2015).
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For the most part, corporate responsibility standards are voluntary, with the exception of new
legislation in India, which has required companies to establish a corporate responsibility
committee of the board and contribute 2% of net profits to corporate responsibility initiatives as
of 2014, 51 building upon strong cultural foundations for the social obligations of successful
companies (and people) in India. 52 That said, many of the topics that corporate responsibility
addresses are subject to domestic regulation, such as labor rights, environmental protection,
consumer protection, anti-discrimination or anti-bribery. And these regulatory standards have
implications for the degree to which voluntary corporate responsibility initiatives are necessary
to fill important gaps, either in a domestic or transnational context. As has been argued by Dirk
Matten and Jeremy Moon, in countries with stakeholder corporate governance systems and more
expansive social welfare arrangements, corporate responsibility is “implicit” in doing business
according to law, so companies do not need to be as “explicit” about taking on social
responsibilities, as do leading companies in more shareholder-oriented countries. 53 As will be
discussed below, recent empirical evidence suggests that these underlying regulatory standards
effectively shape the sustainability culture within countries, and have both a strong effect on how
companies handle corporate responsibility issues and a strong effect on the sustainability

51

See Price Waterhouse Coopers, Handbook on Corporate Social Responsibility in India, available at
http://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2013/handbook-on-corporate-social-responsibility-in-india.pdf.
52
See Peter Cappelli, Harbir Singh, Jitendra Singh & Micael Useem, The India Way: Lessons for the U.S., 24 ACAD.
MNGMT. PERSPECTIVES 6 (2010)(arguing that business managers in India eschew explicit concern with shareholder
value, but invest in employee training, employee empowerment, and a social mission, leading to strong growth and
successful companies). The Tata Steel Company is one example, among many, of companies with extensive
community social responsibility and employee welfare and training initiatives going back over a century. See
http://www.tatasteel.com/corporate/heritage/a-century-of-trust.asp.
53
See Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and “explicit” CSR: A conceptual framework for a comparative
understanding of corporate social responsibility, 33:2 ACAD. MNGMT. REV. 404 (2008).
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outcomes at the country level. 54 To the extent that governments have regulated corporate
responsibility per se, though, such regulation is focused on disclosure.
By 2015, many European countries or their stock exchanges, and the EU itself, require some
environmental or social disclosure, to varying degrees of specificity. 55 The EU’s requirement is
a directive that entered into force on 6 December 2014; member states will need to transpose it
into national legislation within two years. 56 It will require approximately 6,000 large companies
and “public interest organizations,” such as banks and insurance companies, to “prepare a nonfinancial statement containing information relating to at least environmental matters, social and
employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.” 57 This
requirement builds upon EU accounting rules (the EU Accounts Modernization Directive) that
have, since 2003, required companies to report on environmental and labor issues “to the extent
necessary” to provide investors with an accurate view of the company’s financial position and
the risks to that position.58
In addition to the new EU non-financial disclosure requirements, the Nordic countries have
been leaders in requiring corporate reporting that is more comprehensive than the reporting
required by the EU’s 2003 Accounts Modernization Directive. Since 2008, public companies in
54

See Part IV, D, infra.
See Beate Sjåfjell & Linn Anker Sørensen, Directors Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility, 25, in BOARDS
OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND HARMONIZING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES
(Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neveille and Karsten Engsig Sørensen, eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2013/2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322680.
56
See Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014, amending Directive
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and
groups, Official Journal of the European Union L330/1-330/9.
57
See id. at ¶ 6.
58
See Beate Sjåfjell & Linn Anker Sørensen, Directors Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility,25, in BOARDS
OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND HARMONIZING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES
(Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neveille and Karsten Engsig Sørensen, eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2013/2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322680. For further discussion of the 2003 Accounts
Modernization Directive, see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of
Corporate Disclosure Reform in the UK, 31:2 WILLIAM & MARY ENV. L.J. 317 (2007).
55
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Sweden must make a sustainability report consistent with GRI (the Global Reporting
Initiative). 59 Since January 2009, approximately 1,100 large companies in Denmark, as well as
institutional investors and loan providers, have been required to publish an annual corporate
responsibility report, following a 2008 government Action Plan on Corporate Responsibility. 60
Companies may use their annual reporting to the U.N. Global Compact as the framework for
their public disclosure, and institutional investors may report on their incorporation of the
Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) developed by the U.N. Environment Program. 61
And as of 1 July 2013, Norwegian companies must report on labor issues, gender equality, antidiscrimination and environmental issues, including reporting on what they are doing to
incorporate these issues and human rights concerns into management practices. 62
These examples are indicative of a global trend towards required corporate responsibility
reporting. According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for Responsible Investment of the Hauser
Institute for Civil Society at the Kennedy School, Harvard University, 23 countries have enacted
legislation within the last 15 years to require public companies to issue reports including
environmental and/or social information. 63 These countries include Argentina, China, Denmark,
the EU, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland (specific
to state-supported financial institutions after the 2008 financial crisis), Italy, Japan, Malasia, The
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See Jan Bertil Anderson and Frida Segenmark, Sustainable Companies: Barriers and Possibilities in Swedish
Company Law, Univ. of Oslo Res. Paper No. 2013-09 (April 11, 2013), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2248584.
60
See Karin Buhmann, Company Law as an Agent for Migration of CR-Related International Law into Company
Self-Regulation? The Case of the CR Reporting Requirement, 8:2-3 EUR. COMPANY LAW 65, 68 (2011).
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See id. For more information on the PRI, see United Nations Environment Program Principles for Responsible
Investment, available at http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/.
62
See Sjåfjell & Sørensen, supra note 58, at 26-27.
63
See Initiative for Responsible Investment, Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National
Governments and Stock Exchanges (March 12, 2015), available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/CR-3-12-15.pdf.
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Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the U.K. 64 Of these countries,
France is particularly noteworthy, having been a leader by requiring publicly-listed companies to
report data on 40 labor and social criteria since 2002, followed by requirements in 2009 for
companies with more than 500 employees in high-emitting sectors to publish their greenhousegas (GHG) emissions. 65
In addition to these reporting initiatives, seven stock exchanges require social and/or
environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements: Australia’s ASX, Brazil’s
Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malasia, Oslo’s Børs, the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange. 66 Moreover, seven countries
have enacted policies following those of the U.K. and Sweden, which since 2000 have required
pension funds to disclose the extent to which the fund incorporates social and environmental
information into their investment decisions. 67 These countries include Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. 68
Notably missing from any of these lists of comprehensive ESG disclosure is the United
States, which does have specific disclosure requirements in certain regulatory contexts but no
general ESG disclosure framework. Since 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency has
required facility-by-facility disclosure concerning the release into the environment and/or
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See id.
See id., citing the New Economic Regulations Act in France, 2002.
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See id.
67
For a discussion of this requirement in the U.K., and other early social and environmental disclosure requirements,
see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005)(arguing that differences in the “shareholder
wealth maximizing” norm between the U.K. and U.S. were substantial enough to cast doubt on the idea of an
“Anglo-American corporate governance” system).
68
See Initiative for Responsible Investment report, supra note 63.
65
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management through recycling of over 650 chemicals through the Toxic Release Inventory. 69
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires substantial corporate governance
disclosure from its publicly-listed companies, as do most countries. Yet, generalized
requirements for environmental or social disclosure tend to be narrower than those described
above.
Current SEC regulations require disclosure of environmental litigation against any
government agency where a penalty of $100,000 is sought, 70 and the SEC has issued guidance
for listed companies regarding the extent to which they should disclose climate risks to their
future profitability, either from physical changes associated with climate change, or from
regulatory initiatives designed to mitigate climate risk. 71
Four relevant disclosure requirements (with rule-making directives to the SEC) were enacted
as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, each
targeting an aspect of a company’s social record: the ratio of the CEO’s total pay to the median
employee pay; 72 mine safety disclosure; 73 “conflict minerals” disclosure where tin; tantalum,
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See Toxic Release Inventory, available at http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/learn-abouttoxics-release-inventory.
70
See Reg. S-K, Instructions to Item 103, No. 5(C), 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2015). For a discussion of this
requirement, as well as an analysis of the statutory authority of the SEC to require much more extensive social and
environmental disclosure, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
71
See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Rel. 33-9106, 34-61469 (Feb. 8,
2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf.
72
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), § 953(b)(2). The
SEC’s proposed rule to implement this provision was published on September 18, 2013 a 3-2 divided vote, but the
final rule has yet to be promulgated as of April, 2015. Pay Ratio Disclosure Proposed Rule, Rel. No. 33-9452, 3470443 (Sept. 18, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9452.pdf.
73
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), § 1503. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has implemented this requirement as Item 104 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.104. This section was added to Dodd-Frank after an explosion in April, 2010, at the Upper Big Branch Mine in
West Virginia, killed 29 miners. It soon became clear that Massey Energy, the owner of the mine, had a practice of
ignoring the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, having received over 1300 notifications of violations
about that particular mine in the years leading up to the explosion. Democracy Now, Massey Energy Mine Cited for
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tungsten or gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or neighboring countries were
incorporated into listed companies’ products;

74

and “publish what you pay” transparency

disclosure for extractive company payments to host countries. 75 These latter two disclosure
provisions have been challenged in litigation by the National Association of Manufacturers
(challenging conflict mineral disclosure), and the American Petroleum Institute (challenging
publish what you pay), joined in both instances by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
The SEC’s implementing rule on conflict mineral disclosure, requiring listed companies to
engage in a due diligence process to determine if their supplies of the named minerals were from
mines supporting armed rebels or the Congolese army, was generally upheld by the District
Court 76 and Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with one exception identified
by the Court of Appeals. 77 That exception held that required language in reports to the SEC and
on a company’s website that minerals “have not been found to be DRC conflict free” where a
company’s due diligence could not exclude the possibility of conflict minerals in their supply
chains violated companies’ First Amendment rights. 78 This aspect of the Court of Appeals’
decision is being further reviewed by the Court of Appeals, 79 but the rest of the rule has gone
into effect, requiring companies to evaluate whether their supplies are conflict free and to report
on their due diligence procedures, without using the offending required language.
1300+ Safety Violations in Years Leading up the Deadly Explosion, April 7, 2010, available at
http://www.demoCRacynow.org/2010/4/7/massey_energy_mine_cited_for_1
74
See Dodd-Frank, § 1502, enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 13(p).
75
See Dodd-Frank, § 1504, enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 13(q).
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National Association of Manufacturers, Inc. v. SEC, 956 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013).
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See National Association of Manufacturers, Inc. (“NAM”) v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
78
See NAM , 748 F.3d at 372-373.
79
Soon after the Court of Appeals decision in NAM v. SEC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided another disclosure case, en banc, holding against a similar claim by companies (that required
country-of-origin disclosure for meat products violated their First Amendment rights), and using a lower level of
constitutional scrutiny (“rational basis”) than had been applied in the NAM litigation challenging the conflict
minerals disclosure. See American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 730 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir.
2014)(en banc). After American Meat Institute the SEC obtained further review of the conflict minerals disclosure,
and is seeking to persuade the court to uphold its entire rule using the rational basis process of analysis.
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The 2012 “publish what you pay” rule promulgated by the SEC in response to Dodd-Frank
was vacated by the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit for failing to include any
exemptions for public disclosure where host countries prohibit it (such as Angola, Cameroon,
China and Qatar), and for interpreting Dodd-Frank to require public disclosure rather than
considering disclosure only to the SEC. 80 As of March, 2015, the SEC had not reissued the rule.
Generally, though, there is a clear trend towards an increasing number of environmental and
social disclosure requirements around the world. A report by KPMG, UNEP, GRI and the Unit
for Corporate Governance in Africa that identified individual reporting initiatives in 45 countries
found 180 such initiatives in 2013, three times the number they had found in 2006. 81 Such
reporting initiatives included ESG/sustainability disclosure frameworks, such as GRI;
requirements or recommendations for disclosure of individual topics (e.g., GHGs) or addressed
to specific industries (e.g., mining); or were standards regarding sustainability assurance. Of
these 180 reporting initiatives, 72% were mandatory, compared to 58% mandatory in 2006.
IV.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The trends described above of increasing voluntary corporate ESG disclosure, increasing
numbers of voluntary corporate responsibility standards and multilateral frameworks, and
increasing numbers of jurisdictions imposing standards for required ESG disclosure suggest that
corporate responsibility is becoming important in the institutional and normative frameworks
shaping companies’ actions. Notwithstanding these trends, the concept of corporate
responsibility remains contested from a number of perspectives. In the following sections, some
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See American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, No. 12-1398 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013).
See KPMG, UNEP, Global Reporting Initiative and Unit for Corporate Governance in Africa, Carrots and Sticks:
sustainability reporting policies worldwide 8 (2013), available at
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/carrots-and-sticks.pdf.
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empirical evidence about these trends in relation to institutions of corporate governance will be
discussed, followed by a number of critical perspectives.
Two caveats, however, with regard to this discussion of the interaction of corporate
responsibility and corporate governance. The topic of corporate responsibility has been given
increasing academic attention in the past decades, as this table prepared by Timothy Devinney,
University Professor of International Business at the University of Leeds, indicates. This table
shows the number of published articles on corporate responsibility within various fields, based
on a database Devinney constructed.

Area
Environmental Sciences
Economics
Management
Sociology
Psychology
Law

1991 1995
0
6
149
4
0
3

< 1990
2
19
189
14
3
23

1996 2000
2
9
217
10
2
11

2001 –
2005
13
46
604
105
6
50

2006 2010
61
174
1460
295
17
153

Source: Timothy M. Devinney’s Database of Articles on Corporate Responsibility82
The following discussion aims to bring forward a number of the more evocative
empirical research findings about corporate governance influences on corporate responsibility,
particularly those with implications for the future of this field. It clearly does not purport to be a
comprehensive review of this burgeoning literature. Second, the empirical literature on
corporate responsibility is equivocal in many respects, as will be discussed below. This is
arguably not terribly different from the equivocal results of corporate governance research
generally as Ruth Aguilera, Kurt Desender, Michael Bednar and Jun Ho Lee have shown in an
argument for better understanding the effects of external corporate governance (law, the market
82

It should be noted that some significant number of articles in psychology, particularly industrial and
organizational psychology, are published in management journals.
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for corporate control, external auditors, stakeholder activism, ratings agencies and the media) on
internal corporate governance and financial results. 83 As with corporate governance, equivocal
empirical results here simply suggest there is more work to be done.
A. Corporate Responsibility and Financial Performance
One of the perennial debates in this field is whether corporate responsibility initiatives lead
to better firm-level financial performance, the “business case” for corporate responsibility. 84
There are a number of aspects to this debate, but two primary issues have been, first, whether
corporate responsibility initiatives pay off, or whether instead they are a waste of money and
evidence of unaddressed agency costs; and second, if financial performance is found to be better
in firms with robust responsibility initiatives, which way does causation go? Do betterperforming firms invest in corporate responsibility because they have higher slack resources, or
do the investments come first and the better financial results follow?
The research addressing both of these issues has led to a welter of conflicting results, which
is likely due to three primary factors. First, the breadth of issues encompassed within
“corporate responsibility” means different studies are very often looking at different things,
while using the same generic labels, as Judith Walls, Pascual Berrone and Philip Phan have
argued in narrowing their own scope of quantitative analysis, as discussed below. 85 Moreover,
there are different mechanisms by which corporate responsibility initiatives may contribute to a
company’s results, as discussed by Archie Carroll and Kareem Shabama in arguing for a
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See Ruth V. Aguilera, Kurt Desender, Michael K. Bednar & Jun Ho Lee, Connecting the Dots: Bringing External
Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle, ACAD. OF MNGMT. ANNALS 2015.
84
See Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabama, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review
of Concepts, Research and Practice, INT’L J. OF MNGMT. REVS. 85 (2010).
85
See Judith A. Walls, Pascual Berrone & Philip H. Phan, Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance:
Is there Really a Link?, 33 STRAT. MNGMT. J. 885, 886 (2012) for further discussion of this point.
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broader concept of “the business case” for corporate responsibility. 86 These differing
mechanisms, including “business benefits of (1) reducing costs and risks; (2) strengthening
legitimacy and reputation; (3) building competitive advantage; and (4) creating win-win
situations through synergistic value creation,” 87 would affect results depending on the type of
corporate responsibility issue and initiative being examined, the size of the firm, the industry,
and the social and legal context.88
Second, there are mediating variables that until recently were not being carefully
disaggregated. A widely-cited study by Abagail McWilliams and Donald Siegel from 2000 that
discusses the equivocal financial results in studies of corporate responsibility is based on this
point, showing that R&D intensity and advertising intensity of industries explain any significant
financial out-performance from corporate responsibility, while recognizing close correlations
between corporate responsibility and R&D and advertising. 89 As studies have become more
sophisticated in identifying the mediating variables, the results are starting to be more consistent
in showing positive financial results from corporate responsibility.
Third, until recently the data were not very good. Early studies had only a firm’s own
disclosure to “measure” a firm’s social or environmental performance, and some of that
disclosure was undoubtedly exaggerated. Today there are multiple databases collating much
better quantitative and qualitative sources of information about firms’ actual social and
environmental performance—such as the data Bloomberg sells to its clients—and the
misspecification issues are well-known and are being addressed by targeted studies. As a
consequence, certain results are emerging that substantiate the early (2003) meta-analytic result
86

See Carroll & Shabama, supra note 84, at 92.
Id. at 95.
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See id.
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of Marc Orlitzky, Frank Schmidt and Sara Rynes that corporate responsibility investments can
pay off. 90 A number of examples follow.
In a paper showing superior corporate responsibility performance from companies in
countries with a Scandinavian legal origin, and then German and French legal origins, and the
superiority of all three in comparison to the common law countries (results discussed in more
detail in Section D below), Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog show that better corporate
responsibility performance also increases firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. 91 This finding
is consistent with the results of Bob Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim, who
demonstrate that companies with a strategic focus on ESG issues show financial outperformance,
and stock market and accounting value premiums, based on eighteen years’ worth of
observations of 90 matched pairs of high-sustainability versus low-sustainability companies. 92
As Eccles, Inannou and Serafeim recognize, these are long-term strategies and not consistent
with short-term market pressures or results. One can hypothesize that in the United States,
where short-term activist shareholders are becoming increasingly powerful, corporate
responsibility initiatives will be under pressure. More recent work by Serafeim and colleagues
Mozaffar Khan and Aaron Yoon show that management attention to material sustainability risks
yields financial outperformance of 3% to 8%, evaluated within industries using specific concepts
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Working Paper No. 394/2013 (Jan. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360633.
92
See Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, & George Serafeim, the Impact of Corporate Sustainability on
Organizational Processes and Performance, 60:11 MNGMT. SCIENCE 2835 (2014).

23

of industry-relevant materiality being developed in the United States by the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB). 93
If some corporate responsibility initiatives lead to better financial performance, in some
industries and legal contexts, a follow-on question is why. Here a number of very recent
empirical studies show that important mediating variables are innovation and trust. Companies
with a longer-term management focus 94 or a stakeholder orientation 95 promote innovation within
the firm and higher levels of trust of the firm among various external stakeholders. In one study,
Caroline Flammer and Aleksandra Kacperczk used a “natural experiment” to demarcate a
shareholder from a stakeholder orientation of a firm, which was the enactment in various states
of the United States of “other constituency” statutes. 96 In the law literature, these statutes,
which give directors the statutory discretion to consider constituents other than shareholders in
making decisions, particularly decisions to resist takeovers, have generally been interpreted to be
relatively unimportant, and underutilized, albeit with the potential to create ambiguity regarding
directors’ duties. 97 What Flammer and Kacperczk found, however, based on regressions on
159,558 firm year observations, is that measures of innovation—the number of patents issued
and the number of citations to those patents—increased significantly (went up between 6.4% and
6.8%) in companies in states that enacted an “other constituency” statute. 98 They interpret
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these results to show that the protections of other constituency statutes allow for greater
experimentation within the firm, which results in both more “flops” and more “hits” on which
the firm can get a patent. 99

In another study, Flammer and Pratima Bansal found an increase in

firm value after the firm’s adopted longer-term management compensation plans, and also found
improved operating performance on each of three metrics (return on assets, net profit margin,
and sales growth). 100 In year one after the firm adopted the longer-term plan, operating
performance declined, which Flammer and Bansal suggest shows that “increased long-term
orientation may take some time to materialize into higher profits.” 101 Flammer and Bansal’s
results were mediated by increases in innovation after firm’s adopted a longer-term orientation,
as measured by increasing investment in R&D; and increases in social capital investments and
performance (legitimacy, reputation and trust). 102
Empirical results from Jodi Surroca, Josep Tribó and Sandra Waddock support the theory
that intangibles like innovation are a necessary mediating variable that explain the relationship
between corporate responsibility and better financial performance. 103 Their study shows that
corporate responsibility strategies and operating procedures positively influence intangibles of
innovation, human capital improvements, reputation and corporate culture, and that these
intangibles are significantly related to corporate financial performance. 104 If the effects on
intangibles are statistically “pulled out,” then corporate responsibility performance does not
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show significant effects on corporate financial performance. 105 These mediating influences are
stronger in growth industries versus mature industries, and causality is shown in both directions
in both growth and mature industries: better financial performance supports some of the same
intangibles and leads to better corporate responsibility performance, and vice versa. 106 Taken
together, Surroca et al. conclude that it is the necessity of the mediating variables that explains
many of the mixed results of previous investigations of the business case, and explains some of
the modesty of the Orlitzky et al. results in their 2003 meta-analysis. 107
A comprehensive review in 2014 of empirical studies of the financial results of corporate
responsibility by Gordon Clark, Andreas Feiner and Michael Viehs found that 90% of studies
show that sound sustainability standards lower firms’ cost of capital; 80% of studies show that
the stock price performance of companies is positively influenced by good sustainability
practices; and 88% of studies show that better E, S, or G practices result in better operational
performance. 108 While the answers are thus becoming clearer on the empirical questions related
to the business case, it is not fully settled under what conditions corporate responsibility leads to
better firm performance when it does, or the direction of causality. 109 As Devinney put the
question in 2009: What are the corporate responsibility competencies that can be linked to which
specific performance outcomes, and through which operational and managerial competencies? 110
B. Board Composition and Committees
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One structural feature that would seem to indicate a seriousness of purpose about corporate
responsibility, or at least the potential for a connection between a governance mechanism and
corporate social performance, would be a board committee dedicated to the topic. Yet the
empirical evidence is mixed on this point. Judith Walls, Pascual Berrone and Philip Phan made
the methodological observation that there are different aspects to a company’s social
performance, and so the mixed results from empirical studies could be a function of failing to
untangle competing parameters. 111 Moreover, the strategic use of disclosure to manage
stakeholder relationships may obfuscate performance: the worst environmental performers might
use the most environmental disclosure to manage public relationships, for instance, while the
worst social performers (community, labor and supply chain management) might use the least
social disclosure. 112 Since disclosure was used as the evidence for corporate social performance
in many previous studies, such patterns would produce conflicting—and inaccurate-- results.
Thus, Walls et al. only evaluated environmental performance (not environmental disclosure) as a
function of various aspects of governance (size of a company, board structure, ownership,
executive power and executive compensation). 113
The authors found two noteworthy effects regarding the board. First, the existence of a
specialized environmental board committee was related to both better and worse environmental
performance, suggesting that board committees could be established either to promote better
environmental performance or as a reaction to environmental problems. 114 Second, more
independent, larger, and less diverse boards were associated with worse environmental
111

See Judith A. Walls, Pascual Berrone & Philip H. Phan, Corporate Governance and Environmental
Performance: Is there Really a Link?, 33 STRAT. MNGMT. J. 885, 886 (2012).
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113
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outcomes, possibly because of a lack of in-depth knowledge of environmental risks to the
company. 115 Moreover, an important interaction Walls et al. describe is between a strong CEO
(having both the role of CEO and Chairman of the Board) and an insider board: companies with
this configuration have better environmental outcomes than do companies with a split
CEO/Chair and more independent board. 116 As Walls et al. state “This interesting finding
suggests that powerful CEOs may be important for environmental outcomes, and that the vision
of such CEOs can be fostered by boards consisting of supportive inside directors.” 117 The same
general pattern was demonstrated by Surroca and Tribò, who found that increased independence
of the board, split CEO and Chair, and the presence of independent committees reduced
corporate social performance. Surroca and Tribò interpreted these results to suggest that
corporate responsibility is a strategy for management entrenchment and thus indicative of agency
concerns. 118 That is, by establishing stronger ties with internal and external constituents,
particularly employees and community elites, the top management team insulates themselves
from the accountability mechanisms of an independent board and Chair. 119
That a dedicated corporate responsibility committee on the board cannot be taken as an
unambiguous signal of support for the topic is suggested in Table 2, which lists the top 25
companies in the world, by market capitalization, and some features of their corporate
governance and responsibility arrangements.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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From this table we can see both corporate responsibility leaders with dedicated committees
(Johnson & Johnson; Novartis), as well as those companies in industries that have been subject
to pointed social criticism (JPMorgan Chase, criticized for its role in the financial crisis; CocaCola for its role in water depletion in India and contributing to obesity generally through its
products). Notable as well is that of the top 25 companies in the world, by market capitalization,
19 of which are from the United States, only one, Berkshire Hathaway, does not have a portion
of its website dedicated to corporate responsibility or sustainability issues. Berkshire Hathaway
may not need such a page, given that its CEO, Warren Buffett, is known for a clear commitment
to simple guiding principles, such as this one prominently featured on the company’s website:
Given the variety and complexity of ethical questions that may arise in the Company’s
course of business, this Code of Business Conduct and Ethics serves only as a rough guide.
Confronted with ethically ambiguous situations, the Covered Parties should remember the
Company’s commitment to the highest ethical standards and seek advice from supervisors,
managers or other appropriate personnel to ensure that all actions they take on behalf of the
Company honor this commitment. When in doubt, remember Warren Buffett’s rule of thumb:
“...I want employees to ask themselves whether they are willing to have any contemplated act
appear the next day on the front page of their local paper – to be read by their spouses,
children and friends– with the reporting done by an informed and critical reporter. 120
But that even Alibaba, a Chinese internet sales company incorporated in the Cayman Islands which
is being investigated for extensive sales of counterfeit products on its website, 121 would include a
“sustainability” page on its website suggests at least two things: global companies feel pressure
from social actors to be seen to embrace positive social and environmental values; and companies’
disclosure cannot be understood as an unambiguous signal of actual corporate responsibility.

C. Patterns of Shareholder Ownership
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As noted in the introduction to this chapter, there is evidence that some types of institutional
shareholders are paying more attention to ESG issues, and this is one source of pressure on
companies to also pay more attention. 122 Trillions of dollars of invested capital supporting
initiatives such as the U.N. Environment Program’s Principles of Responsible Investment or
backing the Carbon Disclosure Project’s efforts to get better data on company’s management of
GHG emissions sends a signal to companies that at least some investors care about these topics.
Of potentially greater significance, since 2009 Bloomberg has included 79 environmental and
social data points in the information it sells to brokers and dealers throughout the world, as
indicated in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Following the logic of Robert Daines, Ian Gow and David Larcker, presumably Bloomberg
would not be collecting, analyzing and selling this information if there was not a market for
it. 123 Bloomberg has only sold these data since 2009, which gives further evidence of corporate
responsibility as an emerging trend.
Richard Johnson and Daniel Greening have shown that the type of investors in a company
has a significant effect on a company’s environmental and social performance. 124 Firms with
higher percentages of long term, pension fund investors had significantly better performance on
social issues and environmental issues than firms with lower percentages, although the effect on
122

See Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams & Joyti Ganapathi, Putting the “S” Back in
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32:3 ACAD. OF MGMT.
REV. 836 (2007)(discussing various motives for employees, managers, shareholders, customers, NGOs, and
countries to pressure companies to adopt corporate responsibility initiatives, and theorizing about interactions
among those entities and motives, and effects on the firm).
123
See Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How Good are Corporate
Governance Ratings, 98 J. FINAN. ECON. 439 (2010)(while finding the quality of corporate governance ratings to be
suspect given little correlation among the ratings from different providers, the fact that these ratings agencies have a
commercially-viable business shows that investors value the information).
124
See Richard A. Johnson & Daniel W. Greening, The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional Investor
Types on Corporate Social Performance, 42:5 ACAD. MNGMT. J. 564 (1999)( using KLD data ).

30

social issues was modest. 125 Donald Neubaum and Shaker Zahra replicated these results in
2006, finding that large (1% holdings) pension fund investors had a significant and positive
effect on companies’ social and environmental performance, particularly where funds
coordinated their activism. Mutual fund and investment bank holdings had a significant and
negative effect on corporate social performance, but only when these funds engaged in activism,
not when they were simply passive investors. 126 These findings have implications for corporate
responsibility going forward, as short term shareholder activists become more visible, at least in
the U.S. 127. Moreover, these findings have broader social welfare implications given the
emerging research discussed above that shows a long term management perspective fuels
innovation. 128
D. Corporate Responsibility, Legal Origins and Corporate Governance Systems
Consistent with what one might predict, empirical evidence shows that both country-level
sustainability ratings and company-level corporate responsibility ratings are higher in countries
with a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance system than in countries with a shareholderoriented corporate governance system. One quantitative study using MSCI (Morgan Stanley
Capital, International) Intangible Value Assessment data, supplemented with specific social and
environmental data from MSCI’s Risk Metrics, found that:
“among different legal origins, the English common law—widely believed to be mostly
shareholder oriented—fosters CSR the least; within the civil law countries, firms of countries
with German legal origin outperform their French counterparts in terms of ecological and
environmental policy, but the French legal origin firms outperform German legal origin
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companies in social issues and labor relations. Companies under the Scandinavian legal
origin score highest on CSR (and all its subfields). 129
The authors of this study, Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog also find from the analysis of countrylevel sustainability ratings and financial development that countries with higher financial
development (which tends to be those with shareholder-oriented corporate governance systems)
have lower country-level sustainability ratings, including lower environmental responsibility
ratings, and lower social responsibility and solidarity ratings. 130 While the law and finance
literature has emphasized the greater financialization of countries with a common-law legal
origin, 131 Liang and Renneboog’s results suggest that financialization per se does not occupy the
field of important social welfare outcomes.
A similar pattern for the importance of legal origins was found in another empirical study
using a different data source (Innovest), but examining only differences between the
Scandinavian legal system, the “civil and German” legal system, and the common law system
(Great Britain and Ireland) within the EU. 132 In that study Céline Gainet again found that
Scandinavian countries outperformed those based on civil and German law with regard to
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environmental performance, and that both outperformed countries in the EU with a common law
origin. 133 Gainet found the pattern with respect to social performance to be mixed
(Scandinavian countries outperformed both civil and common law in one year, but the common
law countries in Europe, Great Britain and Ireland, outperformed the civil law countries in two
years.) These mixed results may have been due to the short time frame (2004 to 2007) over
which the social performance of the companies was being examined, given data availability, or
they demonstrate convergence in labor protections at the EU level, as Gainet suggests. 134
These studies give evidence of an important vector by which law structures the corporate
social relationship, the legal origins vector, which shapes, among other things, a country’s views
on the proper role of the state in the economy. Where, as in the common law system, the state’s
role in the economy is understood to be more limited in addressing economic inequality or
promoting and protecting labor or environmental interests than among Scandinavian countries or
those based on civil law legal families, there is more pressure for voluntary corporate
responsibility initiatives to address these issues, as Matten and Moon have argued. 135 The above
evidence suggests those voluntary initiatives are less effective in promoting social and
environmental social welfare than are the types of laws and institutional arrangements found in
the Scandinavian and civil law legal contexts.
V.

IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS

Whether attention to corporate responsibility does lead to financial outperformance in some
cases, and what those cases are, does not settle the “case of corporate responsibility,” for there is
a much deeper disagreement with which this chapter concludes. That is the perennial, one might
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say religious, 136 debate over the purpose of the firm. Is it “simply” to produce products and
services that create economic rents to be distributed to rights’ holders according to pre-existing
contractual, statutory and (possibly) normative obligations? (Given that close to 70% of new
companies ultimately fail, that task cannot be taken as too simple.) 137 Or does the firm also have
a social obligation to minimize harm to people and the natural environment in its pursuits of
profits, or even a positive duty to promote social welfare beyond its creation of economic rents?
In corporate governance and law, this debate tracks the competition between a shareholder
versus stakeholder view of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary obligations. The literature on each
side of this debate is so extensive that the following will simply sketch out aspects of the various
positions that have direct implications for differing views regarding corporate responsibility, and
then give some indications of why it might be possible, and important, to narrow the gap
between these seemingly irreconcilable positions.
A. Shareholder Primacy
Milton Friedman’s articulation of firms’ responsibilities is the iconic expression of a
predominantly economic perspective on the nature of the firm:
There is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage
in activities designed to increase profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud. 138
This statement was part of a New York Times article in which Friedman contributed to a vigorous
debate that was then on-going within the business community. Some academics and members of
the business community in the U.S. had begun to argue that companies had responsibilities to
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respond to civil rights and anti-war unrest, as well as strategic interests in providing an attractive
alternative to collectivist social movements like Marxism, socialism and organized labor, by
paying greater attention to making a positive social contribution. 139 Friedman and others taking
his view responded that the social contribution firms make from running a profitable business,
employing people, paying taxes and distributing some part of net profits to shareholders is the
business firm’s positive social contribution. A concern that later writers in this vein articulated is
that trying to create additional social benefits beyond those that flow from honest profit-making
within the confines of law will dilute management’s focus, undermine economic performance,
and thereby ultimately undermine social welfare. 140
A number of arguments for a narrow view of managers and directors obligations devolve
from shareholders’ special position in the firm. One theoretical perspective, the contractarian
view of the corporation as articulated by Steve Bainbridge (among others), asserts that an
implicit term of the contract between shareholders and the firm is that the directors and managers
will act in the shareholders’ best interests, understood as maximizing their wealth. 141 A
pragmatic perspective suggests that given the broad discretion directors and top managers have
to run the firm, and given that in shareholder-oriented corporate governance systems only
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shareholders’ have direct rights to vote or to sue, 142 it is not surprising that firms and their
managers will act in shareholders’ interests in order to avoid being sued, voted out of office, or
thrown out of office in a hostile take-over, as recently argued by Leo Strine, Jr., the Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court. 143

In another recent article, CJ Strine argues that acting in

shareholders’ interests is not only pragmatic but legally required and so corporate responsibility
could be a breach of fiduciary duty. 144 This argument will be discussed in more detail below.
From the shareholder-oriented perspective, corporate responsibility is too much
responsibility to impose on directors. Advancing social policy goals is the job of government,
not business. 145 In contrast, directors are elected by the shareholders to run the firm in the
shareholders’ interests. Balancing other constituents interests’ by making “tradeoffs between the
welfare of shareholders and that of non-shareholder constituencies” 146 is problematic because it
is inconsistent with the proper exercise of directors’ power to advance shareholders’ interests,
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and because it risks undermining accountability by allowing directors to act in their own selfinterest while claiming to act in other constituents’ interests. 147
Given this perspective, the importance of the business case is obvious. If corporate
responsibility initiatives do not make money for the firm, they fail. While many other business
strategies can also fail, such as mergers and acquisitions, where half to two-thirds do not make
money for the acquiring firm and resulting entity, 148 mergers and acquisitions at least aim to
make money for the firm, and so their legitimacy as a business strategy is not in doubt.
Corporate responsibility initiatives do not have that legitimacy of motivation, from the critics’
perspective (although “strategic corporate responsibility” is intended to be profitable, 149 and
many responsibility initiatives are profitable, as discussed above). 150 As a result, in this view,
corporate responsibility is too strong a concept: it risks economic underperformance, it usurps
government’s policy roles, and it is beyond the boundaries of directors’ and managers’ legitimate
exercise of power by seeking to advance non-shareholder interests.
B. Stakeholder Theory
In contrast, to many academic critics of corporate responsibility, it is still too weak a concept.
There are a number of strands to this thinking, as with the shareholder perspective. One is
stakeholder theory, which is the major theoretical competitor to shareholder primacy.
Stakeholder theory is generally attributed to Ed Freeman, 151 although he attributes the idea to “a
very old tradition that sees business as an integral part of society rather than an institution
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separate and purely economic in nature.” 152 From the perspective of stakeholder theory,
economic value is created by voluntary relationships among many parties who cooperate to
create successful businesses. It is an ethical theory about the values of management in
relationships with those parties, and also a management theory about how to create and manage
successful companies. As Freeman states, “[c]apitalism works because entrepreneurs and
managers put together and sustain deals or relationships among customers, suppliers, employees,
financiers, and communities.” 153 This theory does not deny that shareholders are important
stakeholders in the firm, but does reject the view that shareholders’ interests are the only interests
that managers and directors should consider in managing a successful firm. 154
From a stakeholder perspective, successful companies incorporate and rely upon multiple
social and natural inputs, such as an educated work-force, the physical infrastructure for the
production, transportation and distribution of goods, an effective legal system, and natural capital
inputs of water, air, commodities, and so forth. Since some significant portion of the inputs of
corporate success, including financial inputs, have been contributed by parties other than
shareholders, those parties also have interests to be considered in determining the responsibilities
of managers and directors and in distributing the outputs of corporate action. Some, perhaps
many, of those interests will be protected by contractual or regulatory arrangements, but others
cannot be specified ex ante, and so must depend on corporate participants to fairly balance
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multiple parties’ legitimate claims ex post, as in Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team
production theory of corporate law. 155
To some stakeholder theorists, corporate responsibility is too modest, given its emphasis on
disclosure and voluntarism. Some serious, even extreme, human rights problems persist despite
corporate responsibility initiatives and expanded ESG disclosure. Andy Crane has shown that
“modern slavery” (traditional slavery, bonded labor, human trafficking and forced labor) is
endemic in some industries (agriculture, mining, extraction, construction, brickmaking, carpet
weaving, domestic work and sex work); global estimates range from 12 million to 30 million
people enslaved throughout the world. 156 The limits of corporate responsibility can be seen in
the problem of slavery in the West African cocoa industry. That problem was widely publicized
by NGOs, putting pressure on multi-national companies to sign the Harkin/Engel Cocoa Protocol
in 2001, which specifically directed the industry to self-regulate. 157 According to Crane, that
Protocol has led to “pilot programs” to determine the most effective ways to eliminate the
slavery, and “a mooted, but much delayed, program for monitoring and enforcement.” 158 In
other words, fourteen years later the problem has not been solved by industry initiatives. Tragic
evidence of the insufficiency of long-established voluntary company codes of conduct and
industry responsibility initiatives continues to accumulate. The Rana Plaza collapse in
Bangladesh in 2013, which killed 1,134 people producing clothes for 29 global clothing
companies, 159or Barrick Gold’s settlement of claims in 2015 that its security personnel had raped

155

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (2003).
Andrew Crane, Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for
Human Exploitation,38 ACAD. MNGMT. REV. 49 (2013) (citing the ILO and academic studies).
157
See id. at 58.
158
Id.
159
See Clean Clothes Campaign, Compensation is Long Overdue, available at
http://www.cleanclothes.org/ranaplaza.
156

39

137 women in Papua New Guinea over a period of decades, show some limits to the reach of the
voluntary approach.
Moreover, the “business case” may never be strong enough to overcome the economic
disincentives to invest in higher labor costs or expensive pollution abatement without a
supportive regulatory framework that creates a level playing field for competition. Many of the
business drivers of corporate responsibility depend on consumers being willing to pay more for
goods produced in socially-responsible fashion, employees being selective about where they will
work, choosing only the most responsible employers, and investors generally investing and
disinvesting based on social parameters. 160

Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet bring both a moral

and a pragmatic argument to show the limits of each aspect of this business case. 161 As a matter
of morality they argue that the business case is a means to the end of responsible business
conduct, not an end in itself, and should be evaluated as such: “[I]f respect for human rights is
fundamental to our society, whether or not ensuring such respect would bring economic
advantages is irrelevant; achieving it remains our final goal.” 162 From a pragmatic perspective,
neither the ethical consumer movement nor socially-responsible investor pressure are strong
enough to make a demonstrable contribution to the business case without a supportive regulatory
environment, in their view, such as by requiring fair trade labeling of products at the point of
purchase, or requiring consistent, comparable ESG disclosure by public companies. 163 Olivier
DeSchutter also argues for the importance of a supportive regulatory framework. 164 Using an
environmental example, he states “for a government, the most direct solution to [advance]
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environmentally responsible conduct is simply to let the price of energy go up, to collect high
fees for waste disposal (calculated according to volume) and to oblige companies to internalise
the costs of the pollution they create. There would simply be no ground on which to build the
business case for CSR, if we bracket these public interventions away.” 165
Whether the voluntary “business case” is stronger than these assessments suggest may
depend on the reputational benefits and risks of corporate responsibility or irresponsibility, and
the role of the media in amplifying those benefits or risks. Estimates indicate that 70% to 80%
of a company’s market value today is based on “intangibles” such as brand reputation,
intellectual capital and goodwill. 166 High-profile tragedies such as the Rana Plaza collapse or the
Deepwater Horizon explosion cause industry-wide reputational harm and societal (and investor)
pressures for redress. 167 As BP found out after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a gap between
a company’s reputation and the company’s actual performance creates the potential for
“reputational risk,” which may amplify the effects of media coverage of responsibility issues. 168
Apple is an interesting counter-example here, however. While its reputation may have suffered
somewhat from a series of critical media coverage in 2010 concerning the harsh conditions under
which Apple products are produced in China, 169 that negative media coverage has not dented

165

Id. at 221.
See Robet G. Eccles, Scott C. Newquist, & Roland Schatz, Reputation and its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb.
2007), available at https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks.
167
See Clark, Feiner & Viehs, supra note 108, at 14, indicating that after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy BP stock
lost 50% of its value, and the oil majors generally lost 18.5%. Five years later, BP’s share price is still
underperforming its peer group by about 37%. See id.
168
See Eccles et al., supra note 166, discussing how BP’s “Beyond Petroleum” public relations campaign and
widely-reported research projects on solar power led to greater disillusion among consumers after the Deepwater
Horizon explosion.
169
See Richard Bilton, Apple Failing to Protect Chinese Factory Workers, BBC Panorama (Dec. 18, 2014),
describing a BBC Documentary airing in December, 2014, in which a number of BBC reporters got jobs in a
Foxconn factory working on Apple products, and reported on conditions of their work and lives there.
166

41

Apple’s position as the world’s largest company by market capitalization. 170 This disconnect
between media coverage of a social responsibility issue and consumer reactions was
encapsulated brilliantly in the title of an article that empirically studied the limits of the business
case, at least insofar as it depended on ethical consumption: “Sweatshop Labor is Wrong Unless
the Shoes are Cute.” 171
Another criticism builds on assertions about the strategic use of the business case as an
argument for voluntary corporate responsibility rather than regulatory intervention. From this
perspective corporate responsibility is a business strategy employed specifically to resist
regulation, thus undermining the ability of society to cause companies to limit and then
internalize negative externalities. Ronen Shamir has argued that companies have “constructed”
the field of corporate responsibility through teaching in business schools, through lobbying, and
through litigation, as “an essentially voluntary and non-enforceable domain” in order to “resist
the legalization of their social duties.” 172

He has also argued that “through a set of social

events, workshops and public ceremonies,” businesses “shape notions such as “social
responsibility” and “social change” in ways that are amenable to business and employers’
concerns,” thus “preventing the use of law as a means for bringing greater social
responsibility.” 173 His interpretation is supported by an historical analysis by Rami Kaplan, in
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which Kaplan argues that “corporate responsibility was devised [in the 1950’s] by the corporate
capitalist elite, broadly defined, as an instrument for pre-empting governmental intervention.” 174
Thus, from both the stakeholder and the sociological perspective corporate responsibility is
too weak, and yet too strong. It is an insufficient constraint on how companies do business in a
world of accelerating pressures on natural capital and ill-distributed opportunities for human
flourishing. Yet, at the same time it is effectively undermining the conditions for putting more
substantive regulation in place.
C. Evaluating the Arguments
By 2015, the argument that corporate responsibility requires companies and the board to take
on an essentially political role for which they are ill-suited rings hollow, given the extensive
involvement of American companies in law-making, lobbying, litigation to narrow regulation,
and constitutionally-protected electoral politics. 175 But two arguments for shareholder primacy
that are advanced in the U.S. law literature remain important to address: the idea that balancing
multiple stakeholders’ interests will undermine accountability and allow directors and managers
too much discretion to act in their own self-interest; and the argument that it is legally required
for boards and managers to act in the interests of shareholders, and shareholders only, such that
corporate responsibility initiatives could be a breach of fiduciary duty. This Author will address
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the second argument first, because if shareholder primacy is required by law, that ends the
discussion, at least in the United States.
Two points that are relevant to both issues are given insufficient attention in the law
literature, though, and so will be highlighted in advance. First, the data do not support the view
that corporate responsibility initiatives inevitably cause financial losses; in fact, to the contrary.
In an overwhelming majority of cases there is no trade-off between a company’s financial health
and actions that arise from a broad concept of social obligation, as the studies evaluated by
Clark, Feiner, and Viehs show. 176 The management literature is much more sophisticated on this
point than is the law literature. Second, many of the arguments in the law literature against
corporate responsibility ignore what large companies are saying they are doing, around the
world. As set out above, 93% of the world’s largest companies discuss their environmental and
social initiatives, many in great detail, and many including substantiated, audited data about the
effects of those initiatives. 177 Unless one considers everything that a company says about its
social responsibilities to be unsubstantiated public relations, then it should be incumbent upon
judges and law professors who write about these matters to consider these facts in their analyses.
1.

Shareholder versus stakeholder theory

The proper understanding of the implications of corporate boards’ legal obligations for
issues of corporate responsibility has become a matter of vigorous debate again in the United
States, inspired by Prof. Lynn Stout’s short, sharply-critical book, written for a popular audience,
entitled “The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors,
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Corporations and the Public.” 178 That book has inspired multiple, equally critical reactions by
respected scholars, 179 including a number from CJ Strine. 180 CJ Strine recognizes that “directors
are generally empowered to manage the corporation in a way that is not dictated by what will
best maximize the corporation’s current stock price,” 181 but argues that “advocates for corporate
social responsibility” make a more fundamental claim, and “pretend that directors do not have to
make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance within the limits of their legal
discretion.” 182 He rejects the argument of “these well-meaning commentators” that “the business
judgment rule is cloaking a system of law giving directors the ability to act for any reason they
deem appropriate.” 183 Evaluating the arguments in this debate can provide the context for a
number of observations regarding shareholder primacy, stakeholder theory, and corporate
responsibility.
First, it is inaccurate to argue that shareholders have no special place in corporate law in
Delaware and in the United States generally. They clearly do. Shareholders are the only group
entitled to vote for the board and to approve important corporate transactions, although creditors
can also exert control rights through their contracts; shareholders are the only group with rights
to bring suit derivatively on behalf of the corporation; and the board’s fiduciary duties run “to the
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corporation and its shareholders.” 184 These legal rights matter and should not be treated as
unimportant, as Prof. Stout’s arguments can sometimes seem to do.
Yet, as just stated, the Delaware Supreme Court has in a number of cases articulated the
fiduciary duties of directors as advancing the interests of “the corporation and its shareholders.”
When these interests conflict, the Court has upheld board actions that frustrate shareholders’
short-term financial interests in favor of the board’s well-considered views about the company’s
longer-term strategies and prospects (as CJ Strine recognizes but does not discuss in any
detail). 185 In Paramount Communications v. Time, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
directors’ power to reject the shareholders’ views and take defensive measures against a wellabove-market tender offer. 186 While it might be argued that this simply reflects the authority
structure of Delaware corporate law, since it is the directors and not the shareholders who have
the statutory power to manage the company, 187 the Time board’s actions were demonstrably not
shareholder wealth maximizing. If fiduciary principles required shareholder wealth maximizing
in general, the directors’ actions in Paramount v. Time would not have been upheld.
There is one circumstance where shareholders’ wealth must be maximized, and that is
where the shareholders are being cashed out, as in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. 188 In that circumstance, “the duty of the board . . . change[s] from the preservation
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[of the company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for
the stockholders’ benefit.” 189 Revlon duties have also been found where the control structure of
a company is being changed, such as where a publicly-held company with dispersed shareholders
is being pursued by a company with a controlling shareholder, and will become a controlled
company if the transaction goes forward. Paramount v. QVC was such a case. 190 But these are
the only circumstances where the board’s obligation is to maximize share value, according to the
Delaware Supreme Court. Moreover, shareholder pressure cannot put a company into Revlon
mode; that determination is reserved to the board. 191
A former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Norman Veasey, has interpreted
these precedents as follows:
[I]t is important to keep in mind the precise content of this “best interests” [of the
corporate entity] concept—that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. Naturally, one
often thinks that directors owe this duty to both the corporation and the stockholders.
That formulation is harmless in most instances because of the confluence of interests, in
that what is good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively good for the
stockholders. There are times, of course, when the focus is directly on the interests of
stockholders [citing Revlon and Paramount Comms. v. QVC]. But, in general, the
directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to the stockholders.” 192
Moreover, as Prof. Stout and others emphasize, the protection of the business judgment
rule allows directors to make decisions that are in the longer-term interests of the corporation,
such as investing in research and development, building new plants, or paying employees well,
notwithstanding some shareholders who would rather have the company’s money spent on
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them. 193 As a practical matter, there is going to be no liability for a board that frustrates some
shareholders’ short-term interests and decides to pay its employees more than the minimum
wage, for instance, or reduces the prices its products could be sold for so that more employees
can buy the product—the latter of which the board of the Ford Motor Company did in 1915,
which decision was upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford, 194 and the former
as Walmart just did in 2015. 195 This argument about the business judgment rule frustrates CJ
Strine and Prof. Bainbridge, among others, but Prof. Stout (and others) are correct that this is
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how the law operates. 196 CJ Strine is undoubtedly correct that there could be problems if a board
makes a social or environmental decision where there is no conceivable long-term benefit to the
company and thus the shareholders, but in today’s world it is hard to imagine what such a
decision would be, given social expectations that companies will be responsible citizens and the
reputational implications of frustrating those expectations. It is much more likely that a
managerialist decision would create problems, such as a company giving a retiring CEO an
apartment in New York, maid service and fresh flowers for life, which raises duty of loyalty
concerns not implicated by corporate responsibility. 197
Thus, the law—at least as decided by the Delaware Supreme Court—does not yet require
shareholder wealth maximizing as the standard of conduct in order for boards to meet their
fiduciary obligations, except in the circumstances described as being in “Revlon mode.”
Consistent with CJ Veasey’s view, we can conclude that shareholders are important beneficiaries
of fiduciary obligations in Delaware, of course, but only so long as their interests and the
corporation’s long-term interests are in harmony. Corporate responsibility initiatives are one
type of strategy to promote the corporation’s long-term financial well-being, as the empirical
evidence shows, and thus there is no fiduciary breach.
But, even if lawful, is a multi-stakeholder focus going to mask officers’ and directors’
self-interest, and thereby undermine accountability, as has been argued? 198 Both on the question
of self-interest, and on accountability, the prioritizing of shareholders’ interests as it has been
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instantiated in the U.S. over the last three decades has itself masked self-interest and created new
agency problems. Regarding self-interest, as Lynne Dallas argued over a decade ago, “[a] ‘new’
managerialism has arisen that consists of short-term decision making and window dressing to
impress the stock market at the expense of improving underlying corporation value.” 199 In
particular the shift to stock option compensation “provides unique opportunities for managerial
self-dealing. . . .” 200 By 2015, the tight coupling of managers and markets has allowed
managerial rent extraction in the U.S. to an historically unprecedented degree. 201
With respect to accountability, we are back to the question of accountability to whom or
what, and here the Delaware precedents provide a clear answer: accountability must be to the
corporation and its shareholders, taking a long-term perspective on corporate well-being. Yet
today’s concern is that shareholders are putting short-term pressure on companies in ways that
are unproductive for the future success of the corporate enterprise. 202 Activist investors exert a
significant part of this pressure, and an empirical debate is raging over their economic
influence. 203 But in terms of their influence on corporate decisions, Bill Bratton and Michael
Wachter show that activist investors seek one of four things: that more money be given back to
shareholders, in the form of share buy-backs or special dividends; that the company sell itself or
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its premium assets; that the company increase leverage, or that the company cut costs. 204 Some
of the actions to cut costs might be productive, such as finding ways to save energy or use fewer
physical inputs. Others destroy longer-term value, such as putting off needed maintenance of
plant and equipment, delaying marketing campaigns, cutting back on research and
development, 205 or even engaging in financial reporting fraud or value-destroying mergers and
acquisitions, a concern identified by none other than Michael Jensen. 206
In 2014, S&P 500 companies spent 95% of their earnings on share buybacks and
dividends, and they look set to spend over 100% in 2015. 207 This level of share buybacks is so
high that Larry Fink, head of the world’s largest asset manager, Blackrock, has written to all of
the CEOs in the S&P 500, expressing concerns that corporate leaders are meeting activists’
short-term pressures while “underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital
expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth.” 208 One can argue that giving money back
to shareholders is exactly what companies should be doing if they have no positive net present
value investments to make. But it is bizarre to think that American companies, with their
incredible confidence, creativity and organizational capacity, cannot find better, more productive
uses of all of their earnings than giving them back to shareholders (with the not incidental benefit
of keeping stock prices high and fueling a stock market rally), 209 particularly in light of the
enormous technical challenges facing the world from climate change, which scientists tell us
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requires a rapid transition to a low-carbon economy. A more productive system would
encourage managers and directors to manage their companies well and fairly for the longer-term,
which will benefit tomorrow’s shareholders in addition to today’s, but which will also give
management greater latitude to pursue the positive implications of fair employment policies,
high-quality research and product development, good relationships with suppliers, and careful
approaches to natural capital. In stylized form, that is what we see in stakeholder economies
such as Scandinavia, the Netherlands, France, Germany or Austria, albeit under pressure, and
that is what three-quarters of senior executives globally say they would want to see for their
companies. 210
2. Corporate Responsibility Reconciliation
This chapter will conclude by trying to reconcile competing views of corporate responsibility
as simultaneously too strong and too weak, assuming differing views of managers’ and directors’
obligations from shareholder and stakeholder perspectives, but rejecting the view that corporate
responsibility is somehow inconsistent with boards’ fiduciary duties even in a shareholder
system. Even Friedman believed that business has an obligation to conform “to the basic rules of
the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.” 211 Economic
theory recognizes negative externalities as one type of market failure justifying regulation. Each
of the shareholder partisans quoted above thought that policies to address serious social problems
should be developed through laws passed by democratic political processes, not by decisions of
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private companies’ boards of directors. 212 Looking at the self-regulatory initiatives that
businesses have participated in can be used as a framework to determine which issues are
broadly seen to demand regulatory solutions. At least in theory, the need for more hard law
regulating social responsibility issues should be a point of agreement between those who
consider corporate responsibility too strong when devolved to corporate boards for decision, and
those who consider it too weak because it is voluntary and predominantly process based by
emphasizing disclosure.
As both DeShutter and Wouters and Chanet argue, there is a range of regulatory approaches
that can be used to produce a facilitative framework that permits voluntary initiatives to be more
effective. In today’s world, creative regulatory and voluntary approaches to the negative
externalities of human rights abuses, labor exploitation, climate change and declining natural
resources (including, most critically, water) are both hypothesized and in place in some parts of
the world, but in need of serious scaling up to meet the full scope of global challenges. These
approaches can be canvassed for best practices and further learning. Moreover, the accounting
industry has developed and is continuing to develop approaches to integrated financial and nonfinancial reporting, and true-value accounting to incorporate the cost of negative externalities. 213
Implementing intellectually-justified integrated reporting and accounting systems could go a
long way towards providing the information and prices necessary to support capital and products
markets that actually work the way market theories suggest they should work, including fully
internalizing in the prices of products the social costs of producing and using those products.
Beyond such strategies, the voluntary initiatives that companies have adopted to date in just
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about every industry provide important information about what companies consider feasible.
They also provide sources of empirical data about the effects of voluntary initiatives as a way to
evaluate what more is needed to address particular social and environmental issues in each
industry. If additional substantive regulation is needed to advance sustainability goals,
Scandinavian legal and corporate governance approaches may be the most logical place to start
to find models that work, at least as a good first approximation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this author will offer the following anecdote. At a conference in Berlin on
corporate responsibility four years ago, funded by the German government and held with some
fair degree of pomp and circumstance in the German Parliament Offices Building, Dirk Matten, a
leading management academic, described the importance of corporate responsibility with the
following analogy. Having been told once by Jeremy Moon that of all the things that do not cure
a cold, whiskey is the nicest, Matten said that his thinking on corporate responsibility is similar:
that of all the things that won’t cure contemporary capitalism, corporate responsibility is the
nicest. At the least, in his view, it doesn’t make the problems worse.
This chapter concludes by agreeing with Matten’s assessment, with one important caveat.
Corporate responsibility initiatives have likely improved the conditions of employment for at
least hundreds of thousands of people around the world who would otherwise be subject to the
mandates of unrestrained globalization. It certainly brings more attention to the environmental
problems and opportunities of many productive processes and industries, and has thus motivated
companies to develop innovative products and solutions to address those problems. It gives
latitude to people who want to be change agents within organizations, and promotes deeper
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thinking among people and teams in organizations about the effects of the investments, products,
services and relationships they are developing. As the empirical evidence is starting to show, it
can even be a smart business strategy.
Corporate responsibility does not fundamentally change underlying power relationships
between companies and citizens, however, since companies are volunteering to act to address
social and environmental problems—or not. It might dissuade governments from regulating,
though, and in that sense is making problems worse. It leaves gaping holes, such as its failure to
establish “no go” zones. We will no doubt see “responsible tar sands mining” before the decade
is out, which would be an intellectually-bankrupt concept and a tragic development for the
stability of the climate. And as economic development proceeds apace throughout the world,
improving millions of peoples’ standard of living, there are still billions of people living on the
equivalent of $2 dollars a day or less. While those billions of people may surely benefit from
greater access to productive enterprise, the underlying normative and material conditions of that
access matter greatly. So, to the extent that we actually want to solve any of the underlying
global problems of modern capitalism, stronger medicines than the pleasant whiskey of corporate
responsibility are required.
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